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Abstract We propose a unified analysis of exclusives, taking into account NP- and
VP-modifying only as well as just and the adjectival exclusives mere, sole, only,
single, and exclusive. Using paraphrases with at most and at least, we argue that
exclusives uniformly signify a presupposed lower bound and an ordinary content
upper bound on the true alternative answers to the current question under discus-
sion, thus extending Beaver and Clark 2008. We propose that exclusives vary along
two parameters: (i) the ontological type of their arguments; (ii) constraints on the
question under discussion. Due to variation in the type parameter, exclusives ex-
hibit different scopes, leading to different NPI licensing properties. To formalize
our analysis, we introduce a dynamic semantics that treats questions under discus-
sion as part of the context and allows for binding into these questions.
Keywords: Exclusives, Negative polarity, Alternatives, Questions, Dynamic Semantics
1 Introduction
Focus-sensitive particles, most notably the exclusive adverb only, have brought out
fundamental questions about compositionality and the relationship between seman-
tics and pragmatics. Prior work on exclusives has tended to restrict attention to
only; in this paper we consider a wider range of exclusives, including both NP- and
VP-modifying uses of only and just, and the adjectival exclusives mere, sole, only,
single, and exclusive. This paper, which builds on the analysis of mere in Coppock
& Beaver 2010, supports the general approach of Beaver & Clark (2008), accord-
ing to which exclusives can be analyzed in terms of a discourse model involving
the Current Questions under discussion (CQ). We argue that exclusives uniformly
signify a presupposed lower bound and an ordinary content upper bound on the true
alternative answers to the CQ. We propose a lexical entry schema that expresses
this common core and has two parameters allowing for variation among exclusives:
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(i) the type/category of the arguments that the exclusive takes (§3), and (ii) what we
will refer to as a discourse presupposition constraining the CQ (§5).
We argue for at least two instantiations of the type parameter, one which corre-
sponds to a single application of the Geach rule to Beaver and Clark’s analysis of
only (§3.2), and another which corresponds to two applications of it (§3.3). Dif-
ferences in type lead to differences of scope, which predict – as we argue in detail
in §4 – differences in where NPIs are licensed. Along with additional assumptions
involving type-shifting, this fact allows us to account for a puzzle concerning NPI
licensing by just, namely that when modifiying a subject noun phrase, it licenses
NPIs in the VP only on a scalar reading (§3.4).
The CQ parameter, discussed in §5.1, captures constraints that exclusives place
on the question under discussion. Formalizing this parameter leads into new the-
oretical territory, because it requires a framework in which it is possible to state
presuppositional constraints on questions containing variables that are bound by a
quantifier outscoping the exclusive. Our solution, presented briefly in §5.2, is a
generalization of Beaver’s (2001) dynamic semantics using a richer notion of con-
text: meanings of sentences are context change potentials that operate on contexts
containing not only information about what propositions hold, but also a CQ.
2 The common core: MAX and MIN
As Horn (2011) discusses, the late medieval scholars consider only one of the ex-
ponibilia: terms whose semantic analysis requires “unpacking” into multiple com-
ponents. Since Horn 1969, modern semanticists have been debating the nature and
status of those components, which can be referred to as the positive contribution
and the negative contribution (van Rooij & Schulz 2007).
According to Beaver & Clark (2008), the positive contribution of only is ex-
pressed by the formula MIN(φ ), and the negative contribution by MAX(φ ), where φ
is the prejacent. The positive contribution (MIN) is presupposed and the negative
contribution (MAX) is part of the ordinary at-issue content. The MAX and MIN oper-
ators relate to the current Question Under Discussion (CQ; Roberts 1996),1 which
contains a set of alternative propositional answers, ranked by strength; MIN(φ )
means that φ is a lower bound on the true answers to the CQ; MAX(φ ) means that φ
is an upper bound on them. We use the following formalization of MIN and MAX,
where S represents an information state and ≥ represents the strength ranking, and
p is a variable over propositions (functions from possible worlds to truth values),
1 We use ‘CQ’ rather than ‘QUD’ because for Roberts ‘QUD’ refers to an entire stack of questions;
we are referring only to the single most burning question. Note also that the term ‘QUD’ was used in
a different sense by Ginzburg (1996), as part of a theory of questions based on situation semantics.
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and w is a variable over worlds:2
(1) MINS(p) = λw.∃p′ ∈ CQS[p′(w)∧ p′ ≥S p]
(2) MAXS(p) = λw.∀p′ ∈ CQS[p′(w)→ p ≥S p′]
Using the Heim and Kratzer notation for presuppositions, the meaning of only can
then be captured by the following expression:3
(3) ONLYS = λ p.λw ∶ MINS(p)(w).MAXS(p)(w)
This is a scalar analysis because the alternatives are ranked in terms of strength.
Other precedents for a scalar analysis include Krifka 1993, Bonomi & Casalegno
1993, van Rooij 2002, Beaver 2004, Klinedinst 2005, and Riester 2006. This con-
trasts with a more traditional analysis of only that could be labelled the quantifica-
tional analysis (e.g. Horn 1969, Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984, Rooth 1985, 1992,
and Krifka 1992), under which the negative component rules out applications of the
predicate corresponding to the non-focussed material in the prejacent to individuals
other than the denotation of the focus.
We will argue shortly that the scalar analysis is more general in that it can be
extended to a wider range of exclusives, but first let us demonstrate that, as has
already been pointed out, it provides a unified treatment of two readings of only,
which can be referred to as non-scalar, quantificational, or exhaustive on the one
hand, and scalar or rank-order on the other. The most commonly discussed reading
of only is the exhaustive one; this is the most salient reading of a sentence like (4):
(4) I only invited John and Mike.
It is exhaustive in the sense that the focus is taken to exhaust the relevant set of
individuals (thus nobody other than John and Mike was invited). The exhaustive
readings of only as in (4) can be obtained in the MAX/MIN framework by ranking
the alternative answers as a boolean lattice so that, for example, answers like “I
invited John and Mike and Frank” are stronger than answers like “I invited John and
Mike”. Under that type of ranking, what is presupposed according to the MAX/MIN
analysis is that no answer weaker than or unranked with respect to “I invited John
2 On Beaver and Clark’s definition of MIN, which is slightly different from the one in (1), answers
lower-ranked than the prejacent are required to false, which means that the prejacent cannot be true
when it entails lower-ranked answers. We do not want to commit to the assumption that the prejacent
is always the lowest-ranked of the answers; the present formulation requires instead that something
in the CQ at least as strong as p holds.
3 Note that here the presupposed content involving MIN constrains the discourse context, and specif-
ically the CQ. However, the colon/dot notation is normally used to express presuppositions that are
conditions that must hold in the world. We will address this is §5.2 by sketching how such a notion
of presupposition may be made precise.
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and Mike” is true. This rules out the weaker answers “I invited John”, “I invited
Frank”, and answers that are unranked with respect to it such as “I invited Frank
and Joe”. The ordinary semantic content is that no answer stronger than it is true,
so “I invited John and Mike and Frank” is ruled out. (It is also assumed that there is
at least one true answer to the CQ, which gives the entailment that John and Mike
were indeed invited.) Thus the scalar framework can yield exhaustive readings.
Scalar readings are, of course, naturally captured under a scalar analysis as well.
Predicative sentences such as (5) provide a good source of scalar readings:
(5) The inventor was only an employee.
Example (5) does not mean that the inventor had no relevant properties other than
being an employee, but rather that employeehood is the strongest property among
those in question that he has. Thus if ‘manager’ is a stronger property in this con-
text, then he didn’t have that property. Another example of a scalar reading, dis-
cussed by Beaver and Clark, is the following, uttered as a response to a question
about what philosophical celebrity signatures were obtained at a philosophy of lan-
guage party:
(6) I only got a Soames.
This can be true even if the speaker also obtained a signature from the less-well-
known philosopher Schmuckski, contrary to what a quantificational analysis of only
predicts. In the scalar framework, this example can be accounted for by assuming
that the answer “I got a Soames and a Schmuckski” is equivalent in rank to “I got a
Soames.”4
The at-issue component of the meaning of the exclusives only, just and merely
according to the Beaver and Clark analysis, captured formally by MAX, can be
loosely paraphrased in English with at most. In contrast, under the quantificational
analysis of only, the negative component could be expressed with nobody/nothing
other than. In the non-scalar case, both paraphrases for the negative, at-issue com-
ponent yield sentences that are intuitively entailed by an only sentence:
(7) I invited only/just John. → I invited nobody other than John.
(8) I invited only/just John. → I invited at most John.
In the scalar case, however, while the at most sentence follows, the corresponding
sentence with nobody/nothing other than does not:
4 In the case where the scale contains items that are equally ranked to but distinct from the prejacent,
this analysis does not guarantee that the prejacent follows from a positive only sentence. This prob-
lem can be solved either by conjoining the prejacent to the at-issue component of the meaning of
only, or by treating only as a type of intersective modifier.
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(9) John is only/just a janitor. /→ John is nothing other than a janitor.
(10) John is only/just a janitor. → John is at most a janitor.
Under the scalar analysis, the presupposed, MIN component can be expressed in
English with at least. On the quantificational analysis, the positive component can
be expressed with the prejacent. Both the prejacent and at least sentences follow
from positive exclusive sentences, scalar and non-scalar:
(11) I invited only/just John. → I invited John.
(12) I invited only/just John. → I invited at least John.
(13) John is only/just a janitor. → John is a janitor.
(14) John is only/just a janitor. → John is at least a janitor.
But under negation, the difference between analyses once again becomes signifi-
cant. For a negated exclusive sentence, the at least sentence is always entailed, but
the prejacent is not entailed in cases such as (17):
(15) I didn’t invite only/just John. → I invited John.
(16) I didn’t invite only/just John. → I invited at least John.
(17) John isn’t only/just a janitor. /→ John is a janitor.
(18) John isn’t only/just a janitor. → John is at least a janitor.
Although the prejacent is not reliably implied by the negation of a scalar exclusive
predication (as also discussed by Beaver & Clark (2008)), the at least sentence is.
This is illustrated by (18); John isn’t just a janitor means that John’s profession is at
least as high on the scale of professions as ‘janitor’ (MIN), and not upper-bounded
by ‘janitor’ (MAX). Thus at most and at least capture the positive and negative
components that only contributes in both its scalar and non-scalar uses.
Not only can the scalar analysis tie together scalar and non-scalar uses of only
and just (and as Beaver and Clark argue for merely) like those above, it can also be
extended to other uses of exclusives, notably adjectival exclusives. Initial evidence
for this – and a hint as to what form our analysis will take – comes from the fact that
other exclusives yield entailments with at least and at most as well. For example,
consider mere:
(19) He is a mere child→ He is at most a child.
(20) He is a mere child→ He is at least a child.
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Sentences with mere are like sentences with scalar only in that the nothing other
than inference does not follow:
(21) He is a mere child /→ He is nothing other than a child.
Likewise, a negated mere predication does not entail the ‘prejacent’ (to the extent
that there can be said to be such a thing in mere sentences):
(22) He is not a mere child /→ He is a child.
But the at least sentence does follow:
(23) He is not a mere child→ He is at least a child.
The premise of (23) means that the individual in question has a relevant property
that is, in fact, higher up on the scale than ‘child’, e.g. ‘adult’. A use of mere inside
an argumental NP gives rise to at most and at least inferences as well (parentheses
are used to indicate the non-at-issue status of the at least inference):
(24) γ The mere thought of food made me hungry. → The thing that is (at least
and) at most the thought of food made me hungry.
Example (24) (in which the “γ” is used to indicate that the example is attested)
can be paraphrased with just, giving rise to the same at most and at least inferences:
(25) Just the thought of food made me hungry.
This sentence has a non-scalar reading can that be paraphrased with at most and at
least as well. The non-scalar reading is the most prominent reading of the corre-
sponding sentence with only:
(26) Only the thought of food made me hungry.
On this reading, there is nothing other than the thought of food that made the
speaker hungry. That reading implies both At most the thought of food made me
hungry, and At least the thought of food made me hungry.
The adjectival exclusive sole also gives rise to at least and at most entailments.
For example, (27) implies (28) and (29).
(27) He is the sole proprietor.
(28) At least [he]F is a proprietor.
(29) At most [he]F is a proprietor.
Complicating the picture, (27) has two distinct readings, and the definite article
the functions differently in each case. What we term the predicative reading can
be paraphrased as “Only he is a proprietor”; the other reading, which we call the
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equative reading, can be paraphrased “He is the same person as the sole proprietor”.
On the equative reading, the entire definite description is presupposed, as one would
expect of a definite. So it is presupposed that there is an identifiable individual
x such that at least and at most x is the proprietor, and it is at-issue that “he” is
identical to x. On the predicative reading we see more typical exclusive behavior,
insofar as (28) is presupposed and (29) is at-issue. To see this consider (30), the
negation of (27). On its predicative reading, (28) follows but (29) does not.
(30) He is not the sole proprietor.
Our observations regarding (27) can be repeated with adjectival only in place of
sole,5 so adjectival only is also amenable to a MAX/MIN analysis. (This is reassuring
given our analysis of its adverbial cousin.) Exclusive, on the other hand, gives rise
to a different set of at most and at least inferences:
(31) He has exclusive rights. → At most he has rights.
(32) He has exclusive rights. → At least he has rights.
Thus a wide range of exclusives can be paraphrased with at most and at least,
although there is variation in exactly what property the exclusive sets lower and
upper bounds on. While we will only formally analyze a subset of that variation in
this short paper, all the data considered supports the general claim that exclusives
share a presupposed MIN component and an at-issue MAX component.
To capture the differences between exclusives, we propose two parameters along
which they can vary. In the next section, we argue that one of these parameters is
the ontological type of the arguments that exclusives take. Different instantiations
of this type parameter lead to differences of scope, which can be used to explain
certain puzzles related to NPI licensing.
3 The type parameter
3.1 A difference of scope
Beaver and Clark treat only as a sentence operator. This works reasonably well for
both its NP-modifying use as in (33) and its VP-modifying use as in (34):
(33) Only JohnF invited Mary.
(34) John only invited MaryF .
5 Adjectival only is not completely equivalent to sole; unlike sole, only generally does not co-occur
with the indefinite determiner (except in the fixed phrase an only child): a(n) sole/*only owner.
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A sentence-operator analysis could also work for mere in a predicative sentence
like (35), but it does not work for cases in which mere modifies the head of an
argumental noun phrase, as in (36).
(35) The inventor is a mere employee.
(36) A mere child succeeded.
The alternatives that mere eliminates in this case do not include for example ‘An
adult succeeded’, i.e. sentence-sized alternatives. If that were so, then (36) would
imply that there was no adult who also succeeded, but there is no such implication.
Rather, the alternatives are simple predications of x, where x is the discourse refer-
ent corresponding to the subject, like ‘x is an adult’. An appropriate paraphrase for
this sentence would be Someone who is only a child succeeded, with only inside a
relative clause predicating the property of being a child. In other words, mere takes
scope within the NP.
Further evidence that mere takes scope within the NP and not over the whole
sentence is that it generally doesn’t license NPIs in the VP, even though only does:
(37) Only a child said anything.
(38) * A mere child said anything.
We can explain these data under the assumption that mere does not take scope over
the entire sentence, while only does, because these exclusives produce a Strawson
Downward Entailing environment in von Fintel’s (1999) sense. We justify the claim
that NPIs are licensed in the scope of exclusives under our analysis in §4; please
take our word for it for the time being.
Neither sole nor adjectival only licenses NPIs in the VP either:
(39) * The sole/only author got any royalties.
even though they do license NPIs in the noun phrase they modify:
(40) The *(sole/only) student who asked any questions got an A.
This suggests that in general, adjectival exclusives take scope only over the noun
they modify, but there is at least one exception, which we will discuss below.6
3.2 Geached MAX/MIN
Our proposal for ordinary adjectival exclusives is as follows, where lower case sub-
scripts on the variables indicate types (e stands for individual, w is the type of
possible worlds, and p is short for ⟨w, t⟩):
6 Mere does not license NPIs in the noun it modifies: *He is a mere author of any children’s books.
We believe that this is related to the fact that only doesn’t license NPIs in its focus (see e.g. Beaver
& Clark 2002 and Wagner 2005).
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(41) G-ONLYS = λP⟨e,p⟩.λXe.ONLYS(P(X))
We name this function G-ONLY because (41) is the result of applying the Geach
rule to (3).7 (The Geach rule converts a function f with type ⟨a,b⟩ into a function
f ′ with type ⟨⟨c,a⟩,⟨c,b⟩⟩ of the form λR.λx. f (R(x)), where R has type ⟨c,a⟩. In
the case of (41), a and b are p, and c is e, and f is ONLYS.) Analyzing mere as
G-ONLY gives us the following LF for John is a mere employee:
(42) (G-ONLYS(EMPLOYEE))(J)
where EMPLOYEE has type ep, and J has type e. This is, of course, equivalent to
ONLYS(EMPLOYEE(J)).
This treatment of mere will allow us to account for the fact that mere ordinarily
does not license NPIs outside its syntactic scope. The LF for A mere child succeeded
under our analysis is as follows:
(43) ∃x[(G-ONLYS(CHILD))(x)∧ SUCCEEDED(x)]
Notice that the VP, succeeded, is not in the scope of MAX/MIN. If the VP contains
an NPI, as in (38), then the NPI will not be in the scope of mere.
The other adjectival exclusives we have discussed, sole and only, can also be
analyzed as G-ONLY. Of course, mere and sole have hugely different meanings,
and in §5 we will take care of this by including constraints on the CQ. But these
constraints will not affect the scope of MAX and MIN, so what we have said about
them so far suffices to explain the inability of sole and only to license NPIs in the
VP, as illustrated in (40).
The function G-ONLY can also be used for VP-only, if we assume that the de-
notation of a VP is a property. Let us assume that INTRODUCE is a function of
type ⟨e,⟨e,⟨e, p⟩⟩⟩, and the ordinary semantic value of introduced Bill to SueF is
λx.INTRODUCE(B)(S)(x). Then the LF of John only introduced Bill to Sue under
this analysis will be:
(44) G-ONLYS(λx.INTRODUCE(B)(S)(x))(J)
This only can also be deployed to represent the meaning of John is only an em-
ployee, giving (42) as an LF. This explains the intuitive equivalence between John
is a mere employee and John is only an employee, and the fact that both presuppose
John is at least an employee and entail John is no more than an employee.
3.3 Doubly-Geached MAX/MIN
NP-modifying only as in Only John smokes would not be amenable to an ⟨ep,ep⟩
analysis, but it need not be analyzed as the sentence operator ONLY either. To
7 Thanks to Walter Pedersen for pointing this out to us at SALT 2011.
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analyze this case, we assume that John denotes a generalized quantifier, and that
only corresponds to the Geach of our already-Geached formula (41), with a and b
set to ⟨e, p⟩ = ep, and c set to e.
(45) GG-ONLYS = λP⟨ep,p⟩.λXep.ONLYS(P(X))
Let LIFT be the function that converts an individual to the characteristic function of
the set of properties it has: λ j.λP.P( j) (Partee 1986). With this, we propose the
following LF for Only John smokes:
(46) (GG-ONLYS(LIFT(J)))(SMOKES)
This is equivalent to: ONLYS((LIFT(J))(SMOKES)), with the denotation of the VP
inside the scope of ONLY. This predicts, correctly, that NP-modifying only licenses
NPIs in the VP (even though the VP is outside its syntactic scope).
Independent support for the usefulness of GG-ONLY in the analysis of exclusives
comes from uses of mere modifying quantifiers, as in (47). In such cases, mere
licenses NPIs outside of its syntactic scope, in the VP (as discussed in Coppock &
Beaver 2010).
(47) γ ?(A mere) 3% ever really make this business model work for them.
(48) γ I toiled for decades on a Wisconsin campus on which ?(a mere) 18 per-
cent of the entering freshmen ever graduate.
We propose that in examples like (47) and (48), mere’s argument denotes a gen-
eralized quantifier, and mere has type ⟨⟨ep, p⟩,⟨ep, p⟩⟩. So the structure of, for
example, A mere 18 freshmen graduated is:
(49) (GG-ONLYS(EIGHTEEN(FRESHMEN)))(GRADUATED)
where EIGHTEEN is a function of type ⟨ep,⟨ep, p⟩⟩, producing a function of type
⟨ep, p⟩ when applied to FRESHMEN (type ep). This is equivalent to:
(50) ONLYS((EIGHTEEN(FRESHMEN))(GRADUATED))
with the VP inside the scope of ONLY. This accounts for the fact that NPIs are
licensed in the VP by quantifier-modifying mere, even though they are outside its
syntactic scope.
3.4 Scalar and non-scalar just
So far, there has been a tight correlation between the syntactic position of the ex-
clusive and the way that it instantiates the type parameter: When the exclusive is a
sister to a property-denoting expression such as a VP (VP-only) or a common noun
(vanilla mere), we have G-ONLY, and when the exclusive precedes a determiner
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(NP-only, quantifier-modifying mere), we have GG-ONLY. But the type parameter
instantiation does not follow directly from syntax; evidence for this comes from
just. Like only, just can modify NPs:
(51) Just the thought of him sends shivers down my spine.
If we replace just with only, a very different meaning pops out:
(52) Only the thought of him sends shivers down my spine.
Whereas (52) implies that nothing other than the thought of him sends the shivers
(hence, something even more palpable, such as his presence or touch would not),
(51) implies or suggests that his presence or touch would certainly send shivers
if it did not produce an even greater effect. The primary reading of (51) can be
paraphrased with mere:
(53) The mere thought of him sends shivers down my spine.
This is a scalar reading. Just can give rise to non-scalar readings like only in (52),
but the scalar reading is more prominent. (Only can give rise to scalar readings too,
but these are difficult to get.)
The presence of a scalar reading correlates with NPI licensing. On a non-scalar
reading, just does not license NPIs:
(54) ?? Just a smile from him would make any difference.
The sentence strikes one as odd at first, because the scalar reading (on which just a
smile can be paraphrased, “something so insignificant as a smile”) does not license
NPIs. The corresponding sentence with only is fine:
(55) Only a smile from him would make any difference.
And on the reading of (54) on which it is synonymous with (55), it is fine. In other
words, (54) can only mean ‘nothing other than a smile would make any difference’,
not ‘something so insignificant as a smile would make a difference’.
An analysis of the scalar reading of NP-modifying just does not immediately
present itself using the tools we have developed so far. The syntax suggests that
just combines with the NP, and NPs are typically thought of as denoting either
individuals or generalized quantifiers. If the NP is type e, then we cannot analyze
just as G-ONLY or GG-ONLY. If we treat the NP as a generalized quantifier and
analyze just as GG-ONLY, then we falsely predict that NPIs should be licensed in
the VP, because the property denoted by the VP would be fed as an argument to the
generalized quantifier, putting the VP in the scope of MAX/MIN.
We propose instead to analyze the NP as a property, obtained through type shift-
ing, and to analyze just as G-ONLY. A sentence like “just the thought of him sends
shivers down my spine” will be analyzed as “Something that is only the thought of
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[[the thought]] = ιx[THOUGHT(x)]
LIFT = λ j.λP.P( j)
LIFT([[the thought]]) = λP[P(ιx[THOUGHT(x)])]
BE = λQ.λx.Q(λy[y = x])
BE(LIFT([[the thought]])) = λx.x = ιx[THOUGHT(x)]
[[just]] = λPλx[ONLYS(P(x))]
[[just]](BE(LIFT([[the thought]]))) = λx.ONLYS(x = ιx[THOUGHT(x)])
A = λQ.λP.∃x[Q(x)∧P(x)]
A([[just]](BE(LIFT([[the thought]])))) = λP.∃x[ONLYS(x = ιx[THOUGHT(x)])∧P(x)]
Figure 1 Analysis of just the thought (of him).
him sends shivers down my spine”. The property denoted by the NP is formed by
taking Partee’s (1986) BE – a function from generalized quantifiers to properties –
and applying that to the generalized quantifier version of the NP formed through
Partee’s (1986) LIFT, as shown in Figure 1. The result is a property, which serves
as the restrictor of an existential quantifier, so the LF of just the thought of him
sends shivers down my spine is equivalent to:
(56) ∃x[ONLYS(x = ιx[THOUGHT(x)])∧ SENDS-SHIVERS(x)]
The alternatives that MAX relates to would be alternative characterizations of x: ‘x is
his presence’, ‘x is his touch’, etc. This accounts for the possibility of paraphrasing
just the thought of him as ‘something so insignificant as the thought of him’.
This analysis also accounts for the fact that just does not license NPIs on its
scalar reading: ONLY does not take scope over the VP in that case. On its non-scalar
reading, just is just like only, taking the NP it modifies as a generalized quantifier,
which takes the VP as an argument, so NPIs are licensed in that case.
3.5 Summary and discussion
So far, we have seen two instantiations of the following schema:
(57) λP⟨τ,p⟩.λXτ ∶ MIN(P(X)).MAX(P(X))
For property-modifying mere, other adjectival exclusives, VP-only, and the scalar
reading of NP-just, τ is instantiated as e. For quantifier-modifying mere, NP-only,
and the non-scalar reading of NP-just, τ is ⟨e, p⟩.
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We can formulate the type parameter in at least two ways. Under one formula-
tion, (57) is a general schema for exclusives, differing in how τ is instantiated. This
is what we have claimed elsewhere (Coppock & Beaver 2010). Another perspective
we could take is that the type parameter is the number of times that the Geach rule
has applied to Beaver and Clark’s original lexical entry. For the variant of mere
that we find in e.g. (35), along with other adjectival exclusives, that number is 1;
for quantifier-modifying mere and NP-only, that number is 2. (While we would not
want to assume that the entry for mere is somehow derived from the Beaver and
Clark entry for only through an online type-shifting operation, it seems reasonable
that (45) is derived from (41) that way. This accords with the fact that mere is more
frequent in its simpler use, and allows us to capture additional common constraints
on the two uses without having to stipulate them twice.)
These two formulations make slightly different predictions about the range of
possible exclusives. The former, according to which (57) is the schema that exclu-
sives may instantiate, would be consistent with a wider range of possible instan-
tiations of τ , but it would also require that exclusives always take two arguments,
the first of which is of type ⟨τ, p⟩. This rules out the pure, un-Geached Beaver
and Clark exclusive ONLY, unless τ can be instantiated as a degenerate null type ∅,
where ⟨∅,σ⟩ = σ , and the λ -term for the second argument can be pruned when its
type is null. In any case, special extra assumptions would have to be made in order
to allow a sentence operator exclusive under the former view. On the latter view,
the pure, un-Geached Beaver and Clark exclusive constitutes the origin from which
all other exclusives are derived, and in this sense represents the basic case.
So, are there any exclusives that should be analyzed with Beaver and Clark’s
original analysis, without any Geaching at all? Two candidates include the only
that appears in if only constructions, and an only that can be paraphrased as except:
(58) If only I had done my homework, I could have gone dancing.
(59) I would have gone dancing, only I hadn’t done my homework.
If only is arguably not compositional. One argument for this is that it cannot be
used in non-optative contexts, as shown by the oddness of #If only I had left a few
minutes later, I would have missed my train. (See also Rifkin 2000, Biezma 2011,
and Grosz 2011.) The only that appears in (59) is not an exclusive, but an exceptive
(evidence: it can be paraphrased by except). In the absence of more convincing
examples, we are inclined to stick to the claim that (57) represents a general schema
that exclusives instantiate. This opens up the question of what other instantiations
of τ we may find.
209
Coppock and Beaver
4 NPI licensing with MAX/MIN
The arguments we have made above depend on the assumption that MAX/MIN cre-
ates an NPI licensing environment. In this section we will justify that claim, by
showing that the environment it creates is Strawson Downward Entailing. A func-
tion f of type ⟨σ ,τ⟩ is Strawson-DE iff for all x,y of type σ such that x⇒ y
(where the entailment operator is defined cross categorially) and f (x) is defined:
f (y)⇒ f (x) (von Fintel 1999). Von Fintel illustrates the Strawson-DE-ness con-
nected with only with the following argument: If we assume that the presupposi-
tions of Only John ate kale are satisfied – according to his analysis, that John ate
kale – then Only John ate vegetables implies Only John ate kale. In this example,
x corresponds KALE, y corresponds to VEGETABLES, and f corresponds to a func-
tion that, when applied to VEGETABLES, produces the meaning of Only John ate
vegetables.
Applying Strawson Downward Entailment to our theory of only is not entirely
trivial because for us the meaning of only depends on a context parameter that pro-
vides a question under discussion. Let ATE(J,VEGETABLES) stand for the propo-
sition that John ate vegetables (i.e., the characteristic function of the set of worlds
in which John ate vegetables). The meaning of Only John ate vegetables under our
theory is:
(60) ONLYS(ATE(J,VEGETABLES))
where the CQ given by S is “Who ate vegetables?”
The meaning of Only John ate kale relates to a different context S′:
(61) ONLYS′(ATE(J,KALE))
where the CQ given by S′ is “Who ate kale?”
Let us make this slightly more precise. Information states can be represented as
tuples consisting of (i) a common ground (a set of worlds), (ii) a question under
discussion (a set of answers, where each answer is a proposition), and (iii) a strength
ranking over the possible answers to the question. Let us treat questions as sets of
propositions, and notate the question “Who ate kale?” with ⌜?x[ATE(x,KALE)]⌝.
This denotes the set of propositions that ⌜ATE(x,KALE)⌝ denotes under assignments
of x to different values. In general, if x is a variable of type α , then:8
(62) [[?xφ ]]M,g = ⋃d∈Dα [[φ ]]M,g[x↦d]
The ranking over these answers for the examples we are presently considering will
be a boolean lattice corresponding to entailment, notated ⌜⇒⌝. If the common
ground is G, then the information state S′ for Only John ate kale is:
8 This is how the existential quantifier is defined in inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli 2010, Roelofsen
2011). The same syntax is given a different semantics in Groenendijk & Stokhof 1994: p. 37.
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(63) S′ = ⟨G,?x[ATE(x,KALE)],⇒⟩
In order to show that only produces a Strawson Downward Entailing environ-
ment under the MAX/MIN analysis, we must identify an f that produces (61) with
S′ instantiated as in (63) when applied to KALE. Here is such an f :
(64) f = λx[ONLY⟨G,?y[ATE(y,x)],⇒⟩(ATE(J,x))]
To decide whether f is SDE, we need to check whether f (VEGETABLES)⇒ f (KALE),
as long as f (KALE) is defined. Here is an informal argument that this is the case.
f (VEGETABLES) is equivalent to:
(65) ONLY⟨G,?y[ATE(y,VEGETABLES)],⇒⟩(ATE(J,VEGETABLES))
This means, “no true answer to the question of who ate vegetables corresponds to a
group containing John as well as others (and we assume that this group consists of
at least John).” The definedness condition for f (KALE) is a MIN statement that can
be paraphrased, “Any true answer to the question of who ate kale corresponds to
a group that includes John,” or more idiomatically, “At least John ate kale.” From
these two it follows that no true answer to the question of who ate kale corresponds
to a group containing John as well as others, i.e. ONLYS′(ATE(J,KALE)). Suppose
this were not true; people other than John ate kale. Then there would be people
other than John who ate vegetables, contradicting (65). So the argument is valid, at
least when the answers are arranged as a boolean lattice.
Now consider for the sake of discussion (ignoring whether or not this reading
is intuitively available) a scalar reading of Only John ate vegetables, where only
John means something like ‘no one more important or exciting than John’. The
argument is still valid. Suppose that someone at least as exciting as John ate kale,
i.e. MINS(ATE(J,KALE)), where the CQ/ranking in S can be glossed “How exciting
of a person ate kale?”. Suppose further that no one more exciting than John ate
vegetables, i.e. MAXS′(ATE(J,VEGETABLES)), where the CQ/ranking in S′ can be
glossed “How exciting of a person ate vegetables?” It follows that no one more
exciting than John ate kale. Thus, only is Strawson-DE on the MAX/MIN analysis,
even on scalar readings. In general, the scope of MAX/MIN is a Strawson Downward
Entailing environment, so NPIs are predicted to be licensed inside it.
5 Constraints on the CQ and a dynamic account
5.1 Different exclusives, different CQs
Type differences of the kind discussed in §3 are not enough to explain all of the
differences in meaning between exclusives. Consider a mere child and a sole child.
In both cases, what is at-issue is MAX(CHILD(x)), and what is presupposed is
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MIN(CHILD(x)). But the CQs are different. For mere, the CQ is a set of answers to
the question “What properties does x have?”, i.e.: ?P[P(x)].
To support intuitions as to difference between mere and sole, consider the fact
that when mere is paraphrased with only, focus goes on the nominal property; a
mere child is someone who is only a childF . A sole child can be paraphrased with
only as well, and here in a paraphrase the focus goes elsewhere: someone such that
only heF [among the relevant characters] is a child. For a more idiomatic example,
a sole survivor is a survivor such that nobody else (in the relevant group) is a sur-
vivor; a sole proprietor is a proprietor (of an establishment) such that nobody else
is a proprietor (of that establishment). For this type of case, the CQ can be analyzed
as, for example, the question “Who is a proprietor?”, i.e. ?y[PROPRIETOR(y)], with
alternative answers arranged via ≤ as a boolean lattice corresponding to the sum
operation over individuals.
There are other uses of sole that describe a more general state of being unac-
companied by others:
(66) γ If you notice a sole female cyclist peddling down the Karakorum High-
way (KKH) in May, don’t be surprised.
This describes an individual who is unaccompanied by other travellers, not, for
example, a female cyclist among several male cyclists. Such examples are common
with single: A single mother is alone in her status as a parent, not as a mother.
We could represent the CQ for such uses as “Who is a member of G?” where G
is a salient group containing x. This is the type of CQ that seems appropriate for
post-NP alone, as in The thought of food alone made me hungry, as well.
The CQ for exclusive is quite different. Someone who has exclusive rights to
something, for example, has rights that nobody else has; an exclusive offer has
limited availability. Exclusive seems to evoke the question of who is the possessor
or owner of the object in question. These observations suggest that the range of
CQ constraints that exclusives exhibit may be quite broad and we defer a fuller
examination to future research.
5.2 Modelling the constraints: A dynamic account
Constraints on the nature of the CQ can be implemented as additional presuppo-
sitions about the question under discussion. These are what might be termed dis-
course presuppositions, in that they constrain the discourse context, but do not di-
rectly determine which propositions hold in the world external to the conversation,
the stuff that is actually being talked about.
To express the discourse presuppositions introduced by mere and sole, we need
a framework that allows us to require the CQ in the context to be a question that
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contains variables bound by a quantifier outscoping the exclusive. For example,
consider again the LF for A mere child succeeded given in (43), repeated here for
convenience:
(67) ∃x[(G-ONLYS(CHILD))(x)∧ SUCCEEDED(x)]
The CQ provided by the information state S will be ?P[P(x)], where x is bound
by the existential quantifier. Such technology (i.e. questions with free variables) is
independently needed for uses of only inside relative clauses, as in man who only
eats beansF . Ignoring complications relating to the bare plural and genericity, the
latter might be represented as λx.MAN(x)∧ G-ONLYS(λy.EATS(x)(y))(BEANS),
with x occurring free under the exclusive operator. In the short space remaining, we
give a taste of the proper formulation.
Because Beaver’s (2001) dynamic semantics deals successfully with quantified
presuppositions, we propose to use this as starting point, and generalize it using a
richer notion of context. We follow Beaver 2001 fairly closely, making use of a stan-
dard type theory with explicit quantification over worlds, namely Ty3, as defined by
Beaver (2001) on p. 165, an extension of Gallin’s (1975) Ty2 with a type for dis-
course markers (d). For Beaver (2001), the context is represented as an information
state, which is a set of pairs consisting of a possible world and a variable assignment
sequence à la Heim 1982. Information states thus have type ι = ⟨w,⟨σ , t⟩⟩, where
σ = ⟨d,⟨e, t⟩⟩ is the type of an assignment sequence.
Where we propose to depart from Beaver 2001 is in using a richer notion of
context, consisting of (i) a common ground, i.e. an information state, (ii) a question
(a set of answers, where each answer is an information state), and (iii) a strength
ranking over the answers to the question. Under the assumption that the strength
ranking does not rank answers other than those in the QUD, the QUD is recoverable
from the strength ranking; it is its domain. Likewise, the common ground is recov-
erable from the QUD (cf. Jäger 1996). Therefore we represent the context simply
as the strength ranking, and derive the QUD and the common ground from it. Given
a context S, CQ.S is the domain of S, INFO.S is the set of world-sequence pairs that
are elements of every element of CQ.S, and we use ≥ .S to refer to the strength rank-
ing as such; ≥ .S = S. If contexts are type θ , then CCPs are type ⟨θ ,⟨θ , t⟩⟩, i.e., they
are relations between contexts.
Using these terms, Beaver and Clark’s theory of only can be expressed as fol-
lows (we use the period to indicate function application, as in Beaver 2001):
(68) ONLY = λCλSλS′[MIN.C.S.S∧MAX.C.S.S′]
This takes a CCP (C) and returns a CCP (a relation between S and S′), just as the
original ONLY takes a proposition and returns a proposition. The presuppositional
nature of the MIN component is expressed by requiring that the input state S is a
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reflexive point with respect to MIN and C. MAX as defined to take a CCP C and
provide another CCP relating contexts S and S′, where the CQ in S′ is a subset of
the CQ in S containing only information states that are as strong (according to the
strength ranking in S) as any information state that results from updating with C.
This is formalized as follows, where the curly brackets surround a binary predicate
infixed between its two arguments:
(69) MAX =
λCλSλS′[CQ.S′ = λJ[CQ.S.J∧ ∀S′′[S{C}S′′→ J{≥ .S}(INFO.S′′)]]]
MIN is analogous.
Now we are ready to express the additional constraint placed by mere, that the
CQ is about what properties something has. We use a Geached version of (68):
(70) G-ONLY = λPλDλSλS′[MIN.(P.D).S.S∧MAX.(P.D).S.S′]
where D is a variable over discourse referents, and P is a variable over dynamic
properties, i.e. functions from discourse referents to CCPs.
The lexical entry for mere further constrains G-ONLY by requiring a certain
QUD thus:
(71) MERE = λPλDλSλS′[ONLY.(P.D).S.S′∧
∀I[CQ.S.I→ ∃C[C ∈ ?P′(P′.D) ∧ ∃S′ C.S.S′∧ I = INFO.S′]]
This entry ensures that in mere ranges over a scale of properties. Sole is the same
except that it requires the question to be a whodunit: ?D′(P.D′).
6 Conclusion
Like the medievals, we have argued that the meaning of exclusives can be thought
of in terms of separate components. However, our final analysis is not immediately
recognizable as containing the exponibilia suggested by medieval scholars:
(72) λP⟨τ,Π⟩λXτ λSλS′[MIN.(P.X).S.S∧MAX.(P.X).S.S′
∧∀I[CQ.S.I→ ∃C[C ∈Ω∧ ∃S′ C.S.S′∧ I = INFO.S′]]]
On our proposal, the parameters along which exclusives can vary are τ and Ω. The
instantiations of τ that we have given evidence for are (i) d (for discourse markers;
formerly e), and (ii) ⟨d,Π⟩, where Π = ⟨θ ,⟨θ , t⟩⟩ is the type of CCPs. (The latter
corresponds to the doubly-Geached case.) The instantiations of Ω that we have seen
are: (i) ?P ′(P ′.X) and (ii) ?X ′(P.X ′).
Of course, we cannot claim to have provided an empirical argument that this is
the all-inclusive schema for exclusives. We have explored only a few exclusives in
a single over-studied language. A great deal of work needs to be done to discover
the extent to which this schema can be applied to exclusives in other languages, and
the range of instantiations that it may have.
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